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The Scottish Fiscal Commission: 






As the extent of devolution to Scotland of fiscal matters increases, so too does the 
requirement for objective, informed, transparent and independent analysis of and 
FRPPHQWDU\RQWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VILVFDODQDO\VLVDQGSODQV7KHEUHDGWKDQG
quite possibly the depth, of this input will be required to expand as fiscal devolution 
continues.  Some of this commHQWDU\VKRXOGFRPHIURPLQGHSHQGHQWµWKLQNWDQN¶ERGLHV
along the lines of the Institute for Fiscal Studies in the UK.  The further development of 
bodies of this type in Scotland is to be encouraged.  However, some of the input should 
come from a more offLFLDOERG\HVWDEOLVKHGE\EXWQHFHVVDULO\DWDOHQJWK\DUP¶VOHQJWK






The UK has its Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) with remarkable powers ± even to the 
extent that the OBR produces the macro-economic and fiscal forecasts which the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer must use to underpin his Budgets2.  Scotland requires and is in the process of 
formalising the establishment3 of an equivalent body, to be called the Scottish Fiscal 
Commission (SFC), ZKLFK VKRXOG EH VXLWDEOH IRU 6FRWODQG¶s emerging needs as devolution 
evolves.  Initially, this will involve forecasting specific revenue streams from devolved taxes, 
etc.; but over time this role should, and I believe inevitably will, be extended to include issues 
related to the accuracy of overall fiscal forecasting and the sustainability of the public finances.4 
 
Over the past two or three years, the Scottish Government has been working to establish the 
SFC, initially on a non-statutory basis and now via legislation which is being prepared and a 
                                                          
1
. I am grateful for comments on an earlier draft from Professors Peter McGregor and Kim Swales of Strathclyde 
University.  They too provided a submission to the Finance Committee and Peter McGregor also gave oral evidence 
alongside me.  I am also grateful to William Hardie, Policy Officer at the Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE), for all the 
most valuable briefing provided on this topic and for his comments on an earlier draft. 
2
 In fact, some fiscal bodies around the world have even greater powers ± for example to consider and analyse 
alternative policies. 
3 The SFC has existed on a non-statutory basis since June 2014. 
4
 A recent spate of commentary on prospective adjustments to the manner in which the block grant will be calculated 
following implementation of the Smith Commission proposals has indicated that such analysis could be critical to a 
GHYROYHG6FRWODQG¶VHFRQRPLFSURVSHFWV6HHµAdjusting Scotland's Block Grant for new Tax and Welfare Powers: 
Assessing the Options¶ by David Bell, David Eiser and David Phillips; an IFS paper. 
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draft of which was the subject of the latest Scottish Parliament Finance Committee 
consultation.5 
 
The earlier proposals from the Scottish Government were subject to significant criticism on, 
inter alia, the grounds of: 
 
1. Limited independence of the Commission 
2. Inadequate resourcing of the Commission 
3. Unduly constrained VFRSHIRUWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶s proposed activities 
 
The draft legislation goes some way to responding to some of these criticisms.  However, in my 
opinion, the enhancements made thus far are still not fully adequate and further significant 
changes are required if the SFC is to be fit for purpose, both in the immediate future and 
thereafter as the Smith Commission findings are implemented and fiscal devolution of 
substance continues to take place.  In short, the SF&QHHGVWREHµIXWXUH-SURRIHG¶ 
 
A strong and fiercely independent Commission is essential as part of an appropriate economic 
governance framework for a devolved Scotland.  In this context the Finance Committee of the 
Scottish PDUOLDPHQWLVWREHSUDLVHGIRULWVFRQWLQXLQJUREXVWH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
proposals and willingness to seek and take full account of informed commentary.6 
 
This IPPI Policy Brief considers the present state of play on these key aspects of independence, 
resourcing and scope of remit and suggests the appropriate way forward for the final legislation 





One non-negotiable requirement for any fiscal commission is that it must be wholly independent 
from the Government whose analysis and forecasts it is examining and critiquing.  One concern 
about the SFC as initially constituted, i.e. in advance of the current planned legislation, was that 
two of its original WKUHHPHPEHUVZHUHDOVRPHPEHUVRIWKH6FRWWLVK)LUVW0LQLVWHU¶V&RXQFLORI
Economic Advisers.  The risk of conflict of interest here should have been plain to all.  In the 
event, the two individuals (appropriately) stood down from the Council, but this instance 
                                                          
5 Finance Committee consideration of the Scottish Fiscal Commission (Scotland) Bill 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/parliamentarybusiness/CurrentCommittees/93009.aspx  
6 Two commentaries meriting attention are by Ian Lienart, an independent consultant, and SPICE, the Information 
centre at the Scottish Parliament. The Lienart report, published on October 25th 2015, was specifically commissioned 
by the Finance Committee to consider evidence on fiscal commissions from around the world and draw out 
implications for Scotland. The SPICE report by Ross Burnside is shorter and more accessible but containing most 
valuable and pertinent briefing. 
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exemplifies the need both for independence and the perception of independence from all 
quarters. 
 
In the original legislative proposals the SFC was charged, inter alia, with undertaking such 
further work as the Government PD\ ¶IURP WLPH WR WLPH UHTXLUH¶.  Again, that was clearly 
inappropriate. The Commission must not be constrained to areas of work decreed by 
Government but should have the right to undertake, within the confines of its remit, such work 
as it deems appropriate.  The Government should have no power of veto.  Of course we should 
expect close working relations at a technical level7i; so that both SFC and Government should 
understand and generally agree where further work is required.  But the final decision has to be 
for the Commission.  It is encouraging that the proposed requirement to prepare additional 
reports only as required by Ministers has now been dropped. 
 
One further welcome change is that the SFC is to be charged with preparing annual reports to 
lay before Parliament.  That is the correct reporting line and the concept of annual reports, as 
proposed in earlier commentary by, for example, the Royal Society of Edinburgh (RSE), is 
important to underscore both independence and transparency.  The only limitation on 
transparency should relate to any truly confidential data.  I would add that for true transparency, 
such reports, indeed all SFC output, should be not only published but accessible and 
comprehensible.  Their work has to be of the highest technical standard, but that should not 
mean that their findings are not accessible to all interested readers. 
 
However, further changes to safeguard independence are still required.  For example the terms 
of appointments of members should be included in legislation rather than being left to Ministerial 
discretion.  Further, it should be stated that individuals may not be, at one and the same time, 
members of the Council of Economic Advisers and the SFC.  The appointment process should 
be transparent, with the 3DUOLDPHQW¶V )LQDQFH &RPPLWWHH¶V DSSURYDO RI DSSRLQWPHQWV EHLQJ
required. 
 
One final point of relevance to independence also relates to the activities of the SFC.  It has 
been proposed in the draft legislation that the SFC should comment on the forecasting work of 
the Scottish Government, providing comments as these forecasts are being prepared.  As 
stated in thH GUDIW %LOO¶V SROLF\ PHPRUDQGXP - ³WKH UHPLW HQDEOHV WKH &RPPLVVLRQ WR H[HUW
significant influence over the forecasts which underSLQWKH6FRWWLVKGUDIW%XGJHW´ 
 
                                                          
7
 For example I welcome the suggestion by Dr Angus Armstrong and Dr Katerina Lisenkova of the NIESR, in their 
submission to the Finance Committee for a group to be established akin to the Fiscal Liaison Group involving the 
OBR and HM treasury at the UK level. 
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This influence should QRWFRPHYLDFORVHLQYROYHPHQWLQWHUQDOO\ZLWKWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VDFWXDO
forecasting.  Such engagement could easily pose problems, as it would be difficult for a 
&RPPLVVLRQWKDWKDVZRUNHGFORVHO\ZLWK*RYHUQPHQWRQWKHODWWHU¶VIRUHFDVts to then feel open 
to criticise the forecasts as and when these are finalised.  I discuss below the view that the SFC 






As originally established, the annual budget of the Commission was to be £20,000.  This was 
wholly inadequate.  Under the draft legislation the annual budget rises to £860,000.  Taking 
account of the Lienart Report (see footnote 5), this sum should be sufficient to permit the 
appointment, at an appropriate rate of pay, of a close to full time chair and two further part time 
members, also to be paid, with suitable support staff.  The combination of Commissioners and 
support staff should have the required skill sets to undertake the analytical and other work of 
the Commission.  It is not essential that all should be from Scotland and certainly some external 
H[SHULHQFHZRXOGEHRIYDOXHWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VZRUN  And the use of secondees may make 
sense, especially initially. 
 
At times, external inputs for particular pieces of work may need to be bought in, from the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶VEXGJHW  To date, premises have been provided by the University of Glasgow, 
but funding should be sufficient to permit the Commission to acquire other premises if it so 
determined was appropriate. 
 
*HQHUDOO\WKHIXQGLQJDSSHDUVWREHERWKIXOO\µJXDUDQWHHG¶for the medium-term and not subject 
to the whim of Government.  It also appears adequate to permit it to perform the required tasks, 
at least in the early years.8 
 
The SFC should also be permitted full access to all data and other information required, whether 
this comes from UK or Scottish sources. This should mean Memoranda of Understanding with 
a number of agencies and this necessity should be included in the legislation.  Data availability 
is effectively a part of the required resourcing of any Fiscal Commission.  Again, as pointed out 
by the RSE and other commentators, there may be a need for Scottish economic and financial 
data to be enhanced to permit SFC and others to perform their functions effectively.  The SFC 
would be well placed to advise on required data improvements and additions. 
 
  
                                                          
8
 This is also the conclusion of Ian Lienart in his report for the Finance Committee referred to above. 
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4. Scope of activities 
 
At the end of section 2 above, I referred to the view that the SFC should have the right to develop 
its own forecasts.  This view is shared by most professional economists (including Professor 
McGregor and Dr Armstrong who were on a panel with me being questioned by the Finance 
Committee) but to date this has not been the view of the Scottish Government.  To quote from 
the RSE submission: - ³,QOLQHZLWKWKH)LQDQFH&RPPLWWHH¶VUHFRPPHQGDWLRQ, the RSE is firmly 
of the view that the SFC should be capable of producing its own independent fiscal forecasts in 
DVVHVVLQJWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VILVFDOSURMHFWLRQV´ As noted during the evidence session, 
LWLVGXULQJµKDQGVRQ¶IRUHFDVWLQJZRUNWKDWDVWURQJXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHNH\IDFWRUVWRZKLFK
forecasts are sensitive becomes apparent. 
 
To many the ultimate preference is that, as with the OBR, the SFC should produce the forecasts 
which are then required to be used by the Government in their budgetary work.  This does not 
appear to be likely to be agreed at this stage.  However, as confidence in the ability and 
objectivity of the SFC is established it may well be feasible to take this further step towards 
HQKDQFLQJWKHUROHRIWKH6)&DQGKHQFHWKHFUHGLELOLW\RIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VILVFDOSODQVHWF 
 
I also agree with the conclusion from the RSE and others that the SFC should be tasked with: 
³«DVVHVVLQJWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKH6FRWWLVK*RYHUQPHQWDJDLQVWLWVILVFDOWDUJHWVDQGDQ
assessment of the long-WHUP VXVWDLQDELOLW\ RI WKH SXEOLF ILQDQFHV´  This would require the 
Government to develop medium-term budgetary analysis and encourage a move away from 
excessive emphasis on the short-term.  The SFC could also add value by examining the 
consequences of alternative fiscal stances. 
 
At the evidence session with the Finance Committee, two other interesting points were raised.  
A member of the Committee noted that the SFC was not, as matters stood, charged with 
forecasting revenues from either Business Rates or Council Tax.  At first blush, this appears to 
be an anomaly and inclusion of these items should be seriously considered.  Then Dr Armstrong 
noted that the SFC could also assess the cost-efficiency of different means by which 
Government could, in due course, raise funds from external sources.  Again, I agree and accept 
that Scottish Government borrowing is likely to be extended as devolution progresses. 
 
)LQDOO\RQWKLVWRSLFWKHUROHRIWKH6)&VKRXOGEHVRIDUDVIHDVLEOHµIXWXUH-SURRIHG¶E\DOORZLQJ
for extension of its role as elements of the Smith Commission recommendations are 
implemented and when further fiscal devolution is considered and potentially implemented.  The 
requirement for a strong SFC will grow over time and the SFC should be encouraged, under 
initial legislation, to grow in line with that requirement to internationally recognised levels of 
expertise, independence and transparency (as noted above). 
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5. Some conclusions 
 
My firm expectation is that the Holyrood Finance Committee will continue to comment fully and 
rigorously on the proposals for a Scottish Fiscal Commission and will focus on its independence 
(primus inter pares), resourcing and scope of remit.  It is important that objective and informed 
commentators also continue to watch developments and to press for an appropriate legal basis 
for the SFC and then for the new body to be established in sound shape. 
 
At the same time, I very much hope that the capacity for independent analysis on the Scottish 
fiscal front can also be increased, to sit alongside the SFC and to work towards being as 
professional and as influential as the Institute for Fiscal Studies ± but in a form suited to 
Scotland.9 
 
Scottish economic and financial devolution can prove to be greatly to the advantage of our 
economy and economic welfare.  However, checks and balances are essential within the 





                                                          
  
                                                          
9 : Perhaps I should stress that the body or bodies I am encouraging should be Scotland-based rather than offshoots of a UK 
institution. 
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